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Abstract:  We examine  the hypothesis  that the severity  of a recession  favorably affects  the
rate of growth of output during the period immediately  after the recession.  Our
empirical analysis is based on the behavior of  industrial output in  the G-7
countries  during  the period 1960  to 1985. We show  that  the depth  of a recession,
defined as the cumulative output loss between  the peak and trough dates, is
negatively comelated  with growth in the first twelve months  of the subsequent
expansion.
t  We thank Shengyi  Guo and David Oppedahl  for assistance  on this project.  Anirvan
Banerji of the Center for International  Business  Cycle Research  at Columbia  University
kindly provided us with updated  CIBCR growth cycle dates. An anonymous  referee
provided helpful suggestions  on an earlier draft.  The views expressed  in this paper are those
of the authors  and should  not be attributed  to the Federal  Reserve  Bank of Dallas or the
Federal  Reserve  System.1. Introduction
Is the course  of an expansion  hlluenced in any way by ttre character  of the preceding
recession?  In panicular, does  the economy  "recover" from a recession  and does  the strength
of this recovery depend  in any way on the severity  of the prior recession?  In a pair of
earlier papers  (Wynne and Balke (1992, 1993)>  we investigated  this issue  using the
chronology  of business  cycle peak and  trough dates  tlat  the National Bureau  of Economic
Research  (NBER) maintains  for the United States. This chronology  extends  back through the
mid-nineteenth  century and dates  peaks  and troughs  in economic  activity on the basis  of the
cyclical behavior  of a large number  of series. These  peak and  trough dates,  along with a
measure  of aggregate  production, allowed us to investigate  how certain characteristics  of
recessions  in the United States  may inJluence  the course  of subsequent  expansions. We
found that while neither the length nor the steepness  of a recession  was correlated  with
output growth in the flrst twelve months  of a recovery, the cumulative  output loss over the
course  of the recession  was sigrrificantly  negatively  correlated  with oulput growth over this
horizon.  We interpreted  this finding as being consistent  with the existence  of a recovery or
bounce-back  effect.
The notion that there is a period of recovery  that is distinct from the rest of an
expansion  is implicit in a variety of models  of the business  cycle.  One of the earliest  explicit
statements  of this idea  in the academic  litefature  is Friedman  (1969),  who asked  whether  "...
the magnitude  of an expansion  [is] systematically  related  to the magnitude  of the succeeding
contraction? Does  a boom tend on the average  to be followed by a large contraction? A
mild expansion,  by a mild contraction?  "(p.271). On the  basis  of simple  rank  correlationcoefficients,  he found no systematic  connection  between  the size of an expansion  and that of
the subsequent  contraction,  but did find that "a large contraction  in output tends  to be
followed on the average  by a large business  expansion;  a mild contraction,  by a mild
expansion.  "  Friedman  (1992) reiterated  these  findings and presented  some  additional
evidence  in support  of his 'plucking model" of business  fluctuations. Moore (1965) also
pointed out that "...rates of increase  during the initial stages  of recovery [are] generally
larger following severe  contractions  than following mild ones...  [and] that initial rates  of
increase  (during, say, the first six to twelve months)  usually exceed  those  at any subsequent
time  during  the  business  expansion...'  1p.503)
In a real  business  cycle  model  (see  for example  King, Plosser  and  Rebelo  (1988)  and
Kydland and Prescott  (1982)) a recession  cornes  about  as a result of some  adverse  real shock
that knocks  the economy  away from its long run equilibrium growth path.  Recovery  ftorn
the recession  then follows lhe course  of a return to steady  state  equilibrium.  The dynamics
of the recovery are essentially  the same  as the transitional  dynamics  of the standard
neoclassical  Solovian  growth model.  The economy  grows more rapidly the further the
capital stock is from its long run equilibrium level.  Corsequently,  large technology  shocks
that are absorbed  in part by running down the capital stock should  be followed by periods  of
rapid growth.
It is also common  in both the academic  and popular literature to see  recessions
referred to as 'purgative"  episodes  where "excesses"  of one sort or another  are 'cleansed"
from the economy,  and are followed by periods of rapid growth as a result of this cleansing.  r
Popular  statements  of this idea  are  Blinder  (1984,1989,1991),  who tenned  it tle "JoePalooka' effect after a popular children's toy that bounced  back with greater  vigor the harder
it was punched.
We investigate  whether  the strength  of the recovery is influenced  by the severity  of
the prior recession. Specifically, we consider  the notion that the economy  tends  to bounce
back from recessions  - the more severe  the recession,  the more vigorous the recovery.2  In
this paper we look at evidence  for a sample  of OECD countries  (the G-7 countries)  for the
postwar  pedod.  We show that growth in the early stages  of an expansion  tends  to be greater
the more severe  the preceding  recession,  where severity is measured  as the cumulative  oulput
loss over the course  of the recession. One innovation  in this paper is that we examine  the
recession-recovery  relatiorship using data on growth cycles  rather than business  cycles. The
distirrction  between  the two concepts  is simple: business  cycles  are fluctuations  in the
absolute  level of activity, whereas  growth cycles  refer to fluctuations  about  trend.3
2. Dating business  cycles
The empirical strategy  followed in this paper  to test for the existence  of a bounce
back effect considers  individual recessions  and recoveries  as the basic  unit of observation  and
employs  a simple regression  model that allows us to distinguish  between  various measures  of
the severity  of a recession. The first requirement  of this approach,  then, is a chronology  of
peak  and trough dates  that mark the beginning  and end of recessions.  As already  mentioned,
the NBER developed,  and the Center  for International  Business  Cycle Research  (CIBCR) at
Columbia University maintains,  a growth cycle chronology  for the United States  and a
number  of other developed  countries.  Moore and Zxnowitz  (1986) describe  the proceduresused  to construct  the NBER growth cycle chronology:
"1. Measures  of aggregate  economic  activity such  as industrial production, gross
national  product, personal  income, employment,  unemployment,  and sales  of goods
and services  are expressed  in physical units or in constant  prices, seasonally  adjusted,
with their long-run trend removed.  The trend fitting procedure,  called the phase
avefage  trend, provides a fairly flexible growth trend that is substantially  free of the
shorter-term  cyclical  movements  in the series...
2. For each  of the series  above,  computer  selected  peaks  and troughs  are derived
from the deviations  of the seasonally  adjusted  data  from the growth trend...
3. These  tuming points are visually inspected  and sometimes  altered  by shifting the
date, omitting the turn, or adding  another  turn. These  changes  are relatively rare,
affecting pertnps 5% of the turning points.
4. Median dates  in the clusters  of peaks  and troughs  formed by all the series
mentioned  above  are computed.
5. A composite  index based  on the series  above  before their adjustnent for trend is
constructed,  the growh  trend is removed  from the index, and turning points are
selected  in the deviations  from trend.
6. The clusters  of dates,  the median  dates,  and the composite  index dates  are
inspected,  and a decision  is made  on which rnonthly date  best represents  the
consensus.  These  dates  are the growth cycle peaks  and troughs.  "(Moore and
Zarnow  ft.2, 1986, pp.1  7  2-7  7  6)The NBER/CIBCR growth cycle chronology for the G-7 countries  is shown in Table
1.  Sorne  comments  are in order.  The chronology in Table 1 includes  67 growth recessions
(peak-to-trough  movements  in economic  activity).  The chronology  for Canada  begins  with a
trough date, while those  for Germany  and Japan  end with peak  dates.a Three of the 67
expirnsions  last less  than 12 months,  these  being the 1952-53  expansion  in the United States,
and  the 1950-51  and 1975-76  expansions  in Canada,  and are thus too short for our purposes.s
Note that there are also three expansions  that are exactly 12 months  long (the 1961-62  and
1968-69  expansions  in Canada,  and  the 1965-66  expansion  in France).
An alternative  growth cycle chronology for the G-7 countries  has  been  published  by
the OECD (OECD 1987). The construction  of the OECD chronology is similar in many
respects  to the NBER chronology, with only minor differences  between  the two.  The OECD
published  two sets  of growth cycle dates  for member  countries  for the period from 1960
through the early 1980's, one corresponding  to cycles  in GDP and the other conesponding  to
cycles  in industrial production. The first of these  dates  cycles  by quarter, while the second
dates  cycles  by month.  The monthly chronology  for industrial production is shown  in panel
A of Table 2.  The OECD chronology  distinguishes  between  major and minor cycles: the
dates  of the latter are shaded  in the table.  The distinction between  the two is that only tle
major cycle dates  are used  in the trend elimination procedure. The OECD chronology for
the G-7 countries  consists  of fifty  growth recessions,  including sixteen  'minor"  recessions.
The dates  correspond  reasonably  closely with those  identified in the NBER chronology: the
conforrnity is highest  for the United Kingdom and  Japan,  and lowest for France.
Since  the OECD dates  only run through the early 1980's we decided  to supplementttris chronology  with dates  of our own for the period since  then.  Our approach  was to pick
peak and trough dates  using the Bry-Boschan  business  cycle dating algorithm applied  to
Hodrick-Prescott  filtered (log) industrial production series  for each  country.  These  dates  are
reported in panel  B of Table 2.  The Bry-Boschan  algorithm also formed the basis  of the
OECD  dating  procedure  (OECD  1997,  p.27).  The  results  reported  below  are  robust  to the
exclusion  of these  dates  form our analysis.
In the empirical work below we will  report results  for botl  the NBER and OECD
growth cycle dates.
3. Is there a recovery?
The notion of a recovery, and indeed  the name, suggests  a response  or adjusunent  to
periods  of recession. Not all conceptions  of lhe business  cycle necessarily  imply a recovery.
For example,  if recessions  and expansions  are draws from a two-state  Markov model as in
Hamilton (1989), then the notion of a recovery is not empirically relevant. In this section,
we present  some  evidence  suggesting  that output behaves  differently immediately  after a
recession  than during other periods of an expansion.
As we noted  above,  we decided  to examine  the bounce-back  hypothesis  for tle  G-7
countries  using growth cycles  rather than classical  NBER business  cycles  for the simple
reason  that business  cycle chronologies  do not exist for countries  other than the United
States. For the United States,  for which we have  both a business  cycle chronology and a
growth cycle chronology it is interesting  to compare  the two.  This comparison  is shown in
Table 3. A number  of points are worth noting.  First, and  unsurprisingly, there arc more
6growth cycles  than there are business  cycles  during the period covered  by the two
chronologies  (twelve growth cycles  versus  nine business  cycles). The 1980-81  business  cycle
recovery is included in the 1978-82  slowdown  in the growth cycle chronology. Note that the
trough dates  in the business  cycle chronology  tend to match troughs in the growth cycle
chronology, with only two exceptions:  the 1954  growth cycle trough comes  3 months  after
the corresponding  business  cycle trough, and the 1982  growth cycle trough is I month after
the business  cycle trough.  Growth cycle peaks,  on the other hand, tend to consistently
precede  business  cycle peaks,  by an average  ofjust  under 5 montbs. A priori  we would
expect  that growth cycle peaks  would precede  business  cycle peaks,  and ttrat growth cycle
troughs would come  later than business  cycle troughs. The fact that the growth cycle troughs
tend to coincide with business  cycle troughs  tells us something  about  the "shape" of the
business  cycle.  Specifically, growth in the early stages  of an  expansion  must be relatively
rapid compared  to the rest of the exparsion  for the trough dates  of business  cycles  and
growth cycles  to coincide. That is, expansions  begin with periods of strong growth.  If
ilrstead  the growth rate tended  to accelerate  over the course  of the expansion,  we would be
more likely to see  the growth cycle trough coming a lot later than the business  cycle trough.
This phenomenon  of rapid growth in the early stages  of an expansion  has  bee  noted  by other
authors,  including Emery and Koenig(1992)  and Sichel (1992).  Elsewhere  we have
examined  this phenomenon  in more detail (see  Balke and Wynne (1992)).
Figure I  illustrates  the average  monthly grovitl  rate over different phases  of the
growth cycle for each  of the G-7 countries  and all of them combined. For each  country, the
figure shows  the average  monthly growth rate of industrial production  from peak  to peak(labeled  r), the average  monthly growth between  the peak  and ffough dates  (s), the average
montl y growth rate in the first twelve months  of tle  expansion  (g), and the average  montlly
growth rate in the rest of the expansion  (h).  Note that in every case  the average  rate of
$owth  in the first twelve months  of expansion  is consistently  higher than the growth rate in
the rest of the expansion. Furthermore,  growth in the first twelve montls of the expansion  is
also greater  than tlre peak-to-peak  growth rate, which can be considered  an estimate  of trend
growth.  The figure is certainly suggestive  of the existence  of a period of rapid growth ilr the
irnmediate  aftermath  of a recession  that might in some  way be influenced  by characteristics
of the recession. We term this a bounce-back  effect, and in the next section  we investigate
its nature.
4. The bounce-back effect
To test for the existence  of a bounce-back  effect, we consider  a simple empirical
model that expresses  output growth in the early stages  of an expansion  as a function of three
characteristics  of the preceding  recession. The variables  we consider  are measures  of the
depth, length and steepness  of the recession. This builds on rezults  reported  in a pair of
earlier papers  (Wynne and Balke (1992,1993))  where we looked at growth during the first
twelve months  of an expansion  as a function of the cumulative  output decline  over the course
of the  prior recession  using  U.S. industrial  production  data.
4.1 Empirical model
The model estimated  in Wynne and Balke (1992) related  (cumulative)  growth duringthe first k months  of an expansion  to the (cumulative)  decline  in output over the course  of the
prior recession. This can be written in log terms as
(!r,_r - !r,)  = oo + ar(Ti - P,)  ,  ur(!r,  - !r,)  ,  ,, (1)
where y, denotes  the log of output at date  t,  P, is the date  of the peak  denoting  the omet of
tle  i 'th recession,  I,  is the date  of the trough denoting  the end of the i'th recession,  Z+ fr is
t  months  after the trough date  of the i'th recession,  e, is an error term (assumed  to have  the
usual  properties)  and ao, up  a2 are  parameters  to be estimated.
This equation  can be rewritten as
k S,G)  = uo + ar(T, - P,) + uS,(T,  - P,) + e.
where  g,(k) is the average  monttly  growth rate during the first ft months  of the expansion  and
s, is the average  monthly change  in output over the course  of the i'th recession. It is useful
to think of s, as a measure  of the "steepness"  of the decline  in output over tle  course  of a
recession. The 'depth'  of the recession,  as measured  by the difference  berween  output at
the  peak  and  trough  dates,  can  be written  as d, = s17,- pS.
This model in turn suggests  a more general  model of the form
S1(D = co  *  drri  *  ar(7, -  P)  + ars,({  -  P)  + e,
(2)
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(3)This model relates  growth in the first & months  of an expansion  to three characteristics  of the
prior recession,  namely  the steepness  of the recession  as measured  by s,, its length as
measured  by (7,-  P),  and its depth  as measured  by d,  = s{7,-  P)  .  Under the hypothesis
that the severity of a recession  favorably affects  the rate of output growth immediately  after
the recession,  we would expect  some  or all of the estimated  coefficients ct,  d2, c3 to be
significant.  If the dimension  of severity  that matters  is the steepness  of the recession,  we
would expect dr < 0.  If  instead  it is the length that matters,  we would expect  that a,  > 0.
If what matters  is the cumulative  output decline  over the course  of recession  (so that the
"cleansing  effect" of a short sharp  recession  is identical to that of a long shallow recession)
then  we would  expect  o. < 0.
4,2 Results for the G-7 countries
In our earlier studies  of the bounce-back  effect for the United States,  we focused  on
the behavior of industrial production  during and after recessions  primarily because  of the
degrees  of freedom  problem that arises  from taking individual recessions  as the unit of
observation. The Federal  Reserve's  Index of Industrial Production  is available  on a monthly
basis  back to 1919, and Miron and Romer (1990) have constructed  a historical series  for
industrial production that covers  the period from 1884-1940. Monthly measures  of industrial
and manrfacturing output are available  for a large number  of OECD countries  for the
postwar  period, and as we have already  discussed,  reference  cycle chronologies  have  been
published  by Moore and  Zarnowitz  (1986)  and  OECD (1987).
To test for the bounce-back  phenomenon  across  countries,  we focus€d  on the G-7
l0group of industrial nations. An immediate  concem  when pooling tle  observations  from these
countries  for the postwar  period is the potential  effect of the radically different secular
growh  rates  during this period.  For this reason  we decided  to conftol for trend growth rates
in all of the basic  regressions,  yielding tle  following empirical model specification:
C{k) = at  *  crsi *  az(Tt - P)  + d3si(Ti  -  P)  + aor, + 6,
where r, is the trend rate of growth during the i'tl  cycle, defined as the average  rate of
growth from peak  to peak.  Defining the trend rate of growth in this way allows for changes
in the trend growth rate over time.  A priori we expect  that ao > 0.
Table 4 presents  the results  of estimating  the basic  bounce  back equation  for industrial
production in the G-7 countries  ushg the NBER business  cycle dates  reported  by Moore and
Zarnowitz.  The first row of the table shows  the results  of regressing  growth in the first
twelve months  following a trough date  on the depth  variable alone  (i.e. t=  12).  This was the
specification  that was found to be most satisfactory  for the United States  (see  Wynne and
Balke (1992)).  The coefficient estimate  is of the right sign and statistically  significant,
consistent  with the presence  of a bounce-back  effect.  However the low R-2  raises  the
possibility of significant omitted variable  bias.  The second  row of the table augments  the
basic specification  with the trend growth rate.  Doing so.  leads  to an increase  in the absolute
magnitude  of the coefficient estimate  on the depth  variable, but its sign and significance  are
unchanged. Not surprisingly, the coeffrcient  estimate  on the trend growth variable is positive
and  statistically  significant,  and  the R2 increases  dramatically,  from 0.10 to 0.63. The  last
Itthree rows show  the effects  of augmenting  the equation  with the steepness  and length
variables,  both individually and together. As was the case  for the United States,  neither of
these  variables  add anything  to the ability of tle  model to explain growth in the frst  twelve
months  of the expansion. It is perhaps  not surprising  that only two of the coefficients
reported  in the last row are significant in a statistical  sense,  given the potentially severe
multicollinearity between  the explanatory  variables.6 Note that the absence  of any correlation
between  the length of a downturn and the strength  of the subsequent  recovery was also noted
by OECD (f992) for a shorter sample  than that considered  here and  using GDP as the
measure  of aggregate  activity.
Table 5 reports  the results  obtained  from estimating  the same  models  using the OECD
business  cycle dates  instead  of the NBER dates. Note that now the depth  variable on its own
has  absolutely  no ability to explain growth in the first twelve months  of an expansion. When
the depth  variable is augmented  with the trend growth variable, it becomes  significant at the
five percent  level.  As with the NBER chronology, neitler the steepness  nor the length
vaxiables  have  any explanatory  power.  In general  the results  obtained  using the OECD dates
are somewhat  weaker  than those  obtained  usins the NBER dates.T
5. Conclusions
In this paper we prcsented  evidence  supporting  the notion that economies  experience  a
bounce-back  effect following recessions.  We focused  on the behavior  of industrial
production in the G-7 countries  during the postwar  period, and found that the depth  of the
recession  bore a statistically  significant (and negative)  relationship  to growth in the twelve
12month period following the end of the recession. We also examined  measures  of "steepness"
and of length of a recession,  where  the former is defined as the average  monthly growth rate
of ouput over the course  of the recession,  and the latter is simply the number of months
between  the peak and trough dates. Neither variable was found to be significant when
considered  in conjunction  with the depth  variable, confirming our earlier results  for the
United States.
The irnmediate  policy implications  of our results  are not so obvious, as we have  not
examined  how the strength  of the bounce-back  effect is influenced  by policy variables  such  as
interest  rates, govemment  spending  or tax rates. It is arguable  that the existence  of a
relationship  between  growtl  in the early stages  of a recovery and the severity of the
preceding  recession  may reflect some  sort of self correction mechanism  at work.  It is
equally arguable  that rapid growth may reflect a vigorous policy response  initiated as a result
of the severity of the preceding  recession. The rezults  presented  above  do not allow us to
discriminate  between  these  competing  views of recoveries,  but hopefully may encourage
further investigation  of these  competing  hypotheses.  s
However, the results  in this paper, when considered  in combination  with the results  in
our earlier pap€rs,  suggest  tle  existence  of an interesting  empirical phenomenon  that may be
useful  in evaluating  business  cycle  models. Elsewhere  @alke  and  Wynne  (1995)),  we have
examined  the ability of a prototypical real business  cycle model to reproduce  the bounce  back
phenomenon,  and found that typically the relationship  is stronger  empirically than can be
generated  in reasonable  parameterizations  of real business  cycle models.
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t7Table I
NBER./CIBCR  Gmwth Cycle Chrcnology for the G-7 Cou  ries
United Staes Canada Japan Gennatry France Italy UtriEd
Kingdom
Peak 1948:7
Trough 1949:  l0 1950:5
Peak 1951:3 1951:4 l95lt2 1951:3
Trough 195211 l95l:12 1952:8
Peak 1953:3 1953:3 1953:12
Trough 1954:8 1954:10 1955:6 1954:2
Peat 1957  t2 1956:11 1957:5 1955:10 1957:a 1956:10 1955t12
TrouSh 1958:4 1958:8 1959:l 1959:4 1959:8 195917 1958:11
Peak 1960:2 1959:  l0
Trough 196l:2 1961;3
Peak 1962ts 196213 1962:l l  l:2 1964t2 1963t9 l96l:3
Trough 1964:10 1963:5 1963:  I l  3t2 1965:6 1965:3 1963:2
Peak 1964:7
Ttough 1966i2
Peak 1966:6 1966:3 1965:5 1966:6 1966t2
Trough 1967:lO 1968r2 1967:a 1968:5 1967,8
Peak 1969:3 1969t2 lnO.6 l97O:5 1969r  I I 1969:8 l  9:6
Tmugh 1970:ll tnulz l972tl l91l:12 lnLtl 1972:9 1972t2
Peak 1973i3 rn42 ln3.ll 1973:8 1974t5 1974:4 1973:6
Trough 1975:3 19?5:10 WSi3 tn15 1975:6 1975:5 195:8
Peak 196:5 1976:12
Trough 1977:12 lgn tlo
Peak ln8.12 1979:10 1980:2 1980:2 19?9:8 1980:2 1979:6
Trough 1980:5 l98l:8
Peak l98l:6 198?tl2
Trough 1982:12 1982rll 1983:6 1983:7 1983  r5 1983:6
18Tabl€ 1 (coniinued)
NBEWCIBCR Growrh Cycle chronology for Ihe G-7 Countries
Udtad States Canada Japan Germany Fmnce Italy United
Kingdom
Peak 1984:6 1985:11 1985:5 1986:7 1985:6 1985:5





Peak l99l:5 1991.4 1990:8 1990:2
Trough l99Ltl?
Peak 199214
Trough 1992t7 1993:10 l9E3t12 l9Y2t12
Not€s to Table 1.  Source:  Moore and ZamowiE ( 1986)  Table A.8t Center  for Iltmational  Busi@ss  Cycle Research  (1993), Appendix A;
Anirvan Banerji (privat€ comrmlication).
19Table 2
OECD Growlh Cycle Chronology for lhe G-7 Countries
Industrial Production
Unitrd Sbtes Camda Japan Germany Fmnce Italy United
Kingdom
Panel  A: offrcial OECD dat€s
Peat 1960:1 1959:10 1960:9 1960:3
Tmugh
Peak l  2.l l96l:3
Trcugh 1962.12 1963:8 1  2.12 1963t2 l  3t3 1963:l
Peak 1964:2 1965:  I 1964:1 1963:9 1965:5
Trough 1966:2 1965:3
Peak 1966:10 1965tlX
Trough 1967 tj 1968:2 1961t5 1967tlo 1967:8
Peak 1  9:8 1969:3 1970,6 lnots 1969:5 1969:t 1969:6
Trough 1970:ll 1970:10 1972:l Wl:12 197l:5 1972t4 1972t2
Peak tn39 l974tL 1973:l  I l973i8 t974:7 1974:l r93:6
Trough ln5t3 1975:10 1975t3 W5.7 1975:5 1975:5 1975t8
Peak ln9t3 1979t9 1980:2 19?9:12 197917 1980:4 1979t6
Trough l98l:5
Peak
Trough 1982:11 1982:12 1983:2 r982i12 1982:8 1983:6
20Trble  2 (continuei)
OBCD Growth Cycle Chronology for rhe G-7 Coutrtries
Industrial Production
Unit4d States Carada Japen Germany France Italy Unit€d
KiDgdom
Panel  B: Supplemental  Dates
Peat 1984:7 1984:5 1984:10 1983:12 1984:5 1984:8 1984:l
Trough 1984:  l2 1984t6 1985:l 1985:10
Ttough 1986r6 1986:11 19E7:5 l9E5:12
Peak iot
t9 Trough
Peak 1990r9 '9mtT 1991:5 1989t12 l9t0:6
Trough 1991:3 l99l.lZ 1992:8 l99lt4 1991:4
PeNk 1992:10
rrous!  |  tsoi,  to  |  ,*.2  | 199312 1993:12 1994:l
Notes to Trble  2.  OECD (1987) Table 13.3 and authors  calculations. Th€ shaded  d|tes are designated  as "miror  cycles' in the OECD
chronology.
2lToblc 3
Compgrison  of Growth Cycle and Business  Cycle Chmnologies
for  lhe United  States
Growth Cycles Business  Cycles
Peak l94E:7 1948:11

























Notes to Table 3, Source:  Moorc and ZamowiE (1986) Tables  A,5 atrd  A.8; Center  for IrtematioDal Busircss Cycle Research  (1993).
22Teble 4
Estimates  of gIl2)  = c0 + drrr  + d,r(TiP)  + %4  + e,{l
Industrial Productiotr
G-? countries;  using NBER/CIBCR business  cycle dates










































Notes to Table 4.  The semple  consists  of 49 observations. The industrial pro(fuction  datr rre from OECD Maio Ecooomic  Indicators,
Business  cycle peat end trough dates  are liom  Table l.  * denotes  significanco  at the 10% level; **  denotes  significance  at the 5,6 level;
***  denotes  significance  at the I % level.  St{ndard eaaols  arE  in parentheses.
LJTable 5
Estimet€s  of g{12)  = co + dr{  + EzgiP)  + d34 + s,4tl
Industrial Production











































Notet to Table 5,  The sample  co$ists of46  obseftations. The industrial Foduction data arE  ftom OECD Main Economic  Indicators.
Business  cycle peak and tough  alates  are fmm Trble 2.  * donotes  significanc€  at the 10% level; **  denotes  significance  at the 5% level;
***  denotes  significancc  st the l%  level.  Staidard elmts are in parentheses.
241.  See  for example  the recent  papers  by Caballero  and Hammour (1991) and Aghion and
Saint-Paul  (1991).
2.  An obvious corollary that we do not consider  in this paper is that expansions  contain  the
seeds  of the subsequent  recession.
3.  The growth cycle concept  was introduced  by Mintz (1969) at a time when it appeared  that
the traditional business  cycle was dead. Subsequent  experience  has shown  that the traditional
business  cycle  is very much  alive.
4.  Note that the dates  for Germany  refer to West Germany. The OECD industrial
production series  that we use in our empirical work refer to West Germany  for the period
prior to July 1990,  and  to all Germany  from July 1990  on.
5.  In our empirical model we define the recovery period to be the fust twelve months  of an
expansion.
6.  This point was noted  by the referee.
7.  We also examined  the behavior of the model when manufacturing  output is used  instead
of industrial output as the output measurc. The pattern  of the results  was essentially  the
same  as those  reported in Tables  4 and 5.
8.  For some  preliminary results  on the possible  role of policy in contributing to the bounce-
back phenomenon  see  OECD (1992), where it is noted  that strong recoveries  are typically
preceded  by larger interest  rate reductions  than weak recoveries,  and  that strong  recoveries
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